Over 90 percent of the terrorists in Iraq are Iraqis. More specifically, they are Sunni Arabs, often former members of Saddam's security forces. Former Iraqi military personnel are providing the technical expertise for all those roadside bombs. Former Iraqi military munitions dumps are providing the explosives and detonators. The AK-47s and RPGs used to terrorize, or kill, Iraqis, are also formerly the property of the Iraqi armed forces.

Iraqi terrorists have been successful mainly because most of their operations are in Sunni Arab areas, where the population is either pro-terrorists, or terrorized into silence. Islamic terrorists who tried to do it "Iraqi style" in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, found that fewer sympathizers, and more police, made it impossible for them to do much. In both countries, terrorist cells were able to carry out, at best, one or two attacks before being hunted down and arrested or killed. Currently, cells are being caught before they can carry out any attacks at all. But that's not the case in Iraq, where Sunnis are driving the train of terrorism.

If you plug in "Iraqi insurgency" at Wikipedia, you find the word Sunni come up, almost exclusively:

* Ba'athists, the armed supporters of Saddam Hussein;
* Sunni Islamists, the indigenous armed followers of the Salafi movement;
* Foreign Islamist fighters, largely driven by the similar Sunni Wahabi doctrine, as well as the remnants of Ansar al-Islam;
* Nationalists, mostly Sunni Muslims, who fight for Iraqi independence;
* Sunni Muslims who fight to regain the power they held under previous regimes;
* Criminal insurgents who are fighting simply for money; and
* Nonviolent resistance groups and political parties.

So we can almost sum up the "forces of darkness" as being Sunni Arabs, who are in fact, the terrorists that have been running Iraq for over three decades. And these Iraqi terrorists are not yet defeated. No one knows how long it will take to eliminate the terrorism, because in the past, conquerors of Iraq always made deals with the dominant group to help run things. But in 2003, the dominant group, the Sunni Arabs, were not offered control of Iraq by the invading coalition. Worse, the coalition has, in effect, offered control of Iraq to the people who were ruled, and terrorized, by the Sunni Arabs for many generations. And the Sunni Arabs are expressing their displeasure with a terror campaign.

James Dunnigan writes that Al Qaeda still wants to fight on. They are on a mission from God. But the Baath party (Sunnis) is not. For these guys, power is a business. And business has changed with the new government, and an American military effort that Baath has not been able to beat. It's the end of the road for the Iraqi Baath party, although some of the diehards will do just that. Unless the Baathists adopt what Dunnigan calls "Sunni Plan C," and do so sooner rather than later, world leaders had better rally to Iraq overcome it's terrorist "forces of darkness" problem - before it becomes an American or European "forces of darkness" problem.

As Jalal Talabani said in his plea for help, it's "also for the sake of the whole world."