« Let's Say It, "CAIR is a Terrorist Front Organization," With A Dangerous Agenda For America | Main | The Effect Of Gemfibrozil On The Pharmacokinetics of Rosuvastatin. »

November 24, 2004

On Iran and its Nuclear Ambitions, more of the same and the geopolitical issue.

The matter of Iran's nuclear ambitions is very much a topic of interest in the news, but the matter of Iran's nuclear ambitions has much more to do with trust as with Iran becoming just another country  that happens to be "at the center of a region with the largest number of nuclear powers, namely Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and the United States, thanks to the Nato presence in Turkey. One might also add Egypt which is not a signatory to NPT and thus might be engaged in activities beyond the ken of the IAEA." Can Iran be trusted with nuclear weapons, why do they need them, and how can a roque Islamic fundamentalist State whose PMs shouted "Death to America" at the moment of recently voting to move forward with their nuclear program have peaceful intent?  Just as Sadam Hussein toyed with the U.N for years, so is Iran going to play a game of pretending to be sincere about working with the EU until it accomplishes it's nuclear objectives and it is too late to do anything about it. How long is the EU and the United States going to keep taking the Iranians serious?

Let's take a look at an interesting perspective from an Iranian author. From the article "IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROBLEM IS GEO-STRATEGIC, NOT TECHNICAL"by Amir Taheri, in Gulf News September 24, 2004 we have the following excerpt:

"There is no doubt that Iran has the scientific, technological and industrial base to produce weapons' grade uranium. But this is also true of almost all other signatories of the NPT, including those that do not belong to the so-called "nuclear weapons club".

The real question, therefore, is this: does the IAEA trust Iran's present leadership?

The present Iranian leadership has never committed itself to foreswearing nuclear weapons forever, and cannot do that for at least two reasons.

The first is that no regime worth its salt will voluntarily limit its options when it comes to national defence, especially when none of its neighbours are asked to do the same.

Iran is at the centre of a region with the largest number of nuclear powers: Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and the United States, thanks to the Nato presence in Turkey. One might also add Egypt which is not a signatory to NPT and thus might be engaged in activities beyond the ken of the IAEA .

The "Supreme Guide" Ali Khamenehi has issued a statement forbidding the use of nuclear weapons, but not manufacturing them.

The second reason is that the present Iranian regime, like others that claim a messianic mission, is in conflict not only with the regional status quo , which it sees as a threat, but also against the so-called global system dominated by the Islamic Republic's arch-foe, the United States.

Iran's national defence doctrine, as developed since 1989, is based on the so-called " pre-emptive defence" concept.

The assumption is that the enemies of the Islamic Republic and its Islamist ideology will, at some point, use military threat and/or action to check the spread of its influence, especially in its "natural habitat" of the Middle East, the Caspian Basis and the Gulf.

To meet those threats the Islamic Republic needs three assets: a capacity to sustain large casualties in long wars, a massive arsenal of medium and long-range missiles to compensate for the weakness of its air force, and a nuclear arsenal to deter the " big powers", meaning the United States, that wish to curb Tehran's regional ambitions.

Without its nuclear component, the Iranian national defence doctrine would have little value beyond diplomatic gesticulations.

The question therefore is not to persuade Iran to abandon the nuclear component of its dotcorine but to revise its regional and global ambitions.

An Iran that does not want to "export" its Khomeinist ideology or reshape the map of the region will not be a threat even if it has nuclear weapons.

One question that is often asked is why should Iran be singled out while others, notably India, Pakistan and Israel, are allowed to do as they please?

The answer is that India, Pakistan and Israel are not signatories of the NPT and have no obligation to act in accordance with the rules of the IAEA.

Not a victim

Developing and deploying nuclear weapons is not illegal. The Islamic Republic is not the victim of any conspiracy or unjust treatment. It could withdraw from the NPT, and do as it pleases.

The problem is that the mullahs want to have it both ways. They want to stay in the NPT so as to benefit from legal access to technology, equipment and materiel.

If they withdraw from the IAEA whatever they buy would be regarded as illegal and banned by the signatories of the NPT."

The problem, as stated above, is one of trust. The IAEA's chief, Mohammad El-Baradei made that point abundantly clear when he said Iran needed to suspend its enrichment activities "in order to restore confidence".

Last year, Iran agreed to suspend enrichment after it was found to have concealed an extensive illegal programme, a breach of its treaty obligations. But it almost immediately began to "cheat-and-retreat" over what activities were covered.

In July, Iran resumed the manufacture of centrifuge parts and the assembly of centrifuge units, while pledging not to use those to enrich uranium. Trust and confidence, of course, are subjective notions.

Why do people trust Japan, for example, not to secretly manufacture nuclear weapons, but refuse the same to the Islamic Republic?

There is no way for IAEA ever to find out exactly what Iran is up to without sincere cooperation from the Tehran leadership.

The IAEA was able to close down the nuclear programmes of Kazakhstan, the Ukraine, Byelorussia and South Africa because it was invited by the governments of those countries to do so.     Read More...
(Amir Taheri is an Iranian author of ten books on the Middle East and Islam. He's reachable through www.benadorassociates.com)

From the viewpoint of Iran, it's not in it's strategic interest to stop going nuclear. The problem is what it plans to do with it's weaponry. Although not effectively addressed in Mr. Taheri's article, the clear answer is that Iran cannot be trusted with nuclear weapons because it has long been and continues to be a world-wide sponsor of terrorism and terrorist causes. A nuclear weapon in the hands of a terrorist-supporting State is unacceptable to civilized society.  Libya which transferred the material and the equipment it had assembled to the United States. As Mr. Tahere discussed in his article, is the real question whether or not the major powers are prepared to accept the Islamic Republic on its own terms, which includes a capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons, or will the major powers be able to persuade Tehran to abandon its revolutionary ambitions and seek a normal place within the global system? If this is the real issue then Mr. Taher is correct and the Iran issue  is a geo-strategic problem, not a technical one about uranium enrichment and centrifuges.  However, regardles of how one chooses to categorize the Iran problem, a terrorist State cannot be allowed to develop nuclear weapons that can be handed over to terrorists. A State whose stated goal is to destroy the "evil Satan" America and Israel is one that cannot be trusted to possess nuclear capability. Iran will continue to "jerk the chain" of the U.N., European leaders, and the U.S. as long as it takes to accomplish it's nuclear goals. After all, N. Korea is it's model.

Captain's Quarters also has posted today on Iran's nulear ambitions and also asks how long the U.N., the EU and the US. are going to keep taking Iran serious, especially in light of their instant and frequent changes of heart and issues (today they want to keep making centrifuges for research purposes).

INDC Journal posts a reference to it's excellent article of Nov 16, "The Next War Is Already Here."

Posted by Hyscience at November 24, 2004 3:05 PM

• On Iran and its Nuclear Ambitions, more of the same and the geopolitical issue. - Nov 24, 2004